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Abstract
In production economies, the extent to which non-equilibria are blocked depends
on the allocation of control rights among shareholders, because a blocking coalition’s
resources are aﬀected by the ﬁrms it jointly owns with outsiders. We formulate a notion
of blocking that takes such interdependency problem into account, and we prove an
analog of the Debreu-Scarf theorem for replica production economies. Our theorem
diﬀers from theirs in using an additional assumption, which we argue is indispensable
and is driven by the interdependency problem.
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Built upon Edgeworth’s [6] elegant idea that the outcome of decentralized markets should
be robust against any multilateral deviation, the core equivalence theorem has provided a
justiﬁcation for Walras (competitive) equilibrium. But the theorem is conﬁned to either
exchange economies or production economies with publicly accessible technologies. This
paper extends the theorem to production economies where technologies are controlled by
individuals according to corporate shares. It is nontrivial to introduce production with such
private ownership. Without it, multilateral deviation from a status quo can be viewed simply
as forming a self-suﬃcient blocking coalition such that each member is better-oﬀ than the
status quo. With production, by contrast, it is not clear what it means for a coalition to
be “self-suﬃcient.” Can the coalition change the action of a ﬁrm not entirely owned by the
members of the coalition? If Yes, what conditions does it need to respect for the shareholders
outside the coalition? If No, does the coalition still have to carry out the part of the status
quo production plan assigned to its members who are shareholders of the ﬁrm?
For example, suppose a blocking coalition owns only 1/3 of a ﬁrm but is endowed with
a good needed by outsiders. If the coalition blocks the supply of the good, the outsiders
cannot obtain feasible consumptions unless they change the action of the ﬁrm, which they
can control via majority shares. Once the ﬁrm’s action is changed, the blocking coalition
either carries out 1/3 of the new action or forfeits its shares of the ﬁrm if default is allowed.
Either way would change the resources within the coalition.
In this paper, we formulate a notion of blocking that takes the above-illustrated inter-
dependency problem into account. The novelty of this notion is that it adds to the deﬁnition
of blocking a requirement that the blocking plan of a coalition should allow the outsiders
to have a feasible consumption plan. This outsiders’ feasibility condition, while vacuous in
exchange economies, imposes a constraint on the kind of actions that a blocking coalition
can have a ﬁrm do even if the ﬁrm is under its control.
Then we prove a core equivalence theorem (Theorem 1) for a general class of replica
economies with preference- and endowment-assumptions similar to those in Debreu and
Scarf [5], except that we also use a new assumption, boundary aversion.
This new assumption of boundary aversion turns out to be indispensable in the repli-
cation framework with production: If the interdependency problem is captured by the out-
1siders’ feasibility condition, Example 1 shows that the assumption is indispensable for our
core equivalence theorem. In contrast, had we ignored the outsiders’ feasibility condition
and still assumed that shareholders cannot default, Proposition 2 says that core equivalence
follows from the same set of assumptions except boundary aversion. Furthermore, Propo-
sition 3 says that, even if the interdependency problem is disentangled by allowing default,
core equivalence fails in an economy that violates the boundary aversion assumption.
Theorem 2 generalizes our core equivalence theorem when the notion of blocking is
slightly strengthened by a fairness condition.
We will review the related works in §5.
2 The Model
2.1 The Primitives
There are a ﬁnite set I of individuals, a ﬁnite set J of ﬁrms, and a ﬁnite number l of
goods. Let i be the index for individuals and j for ﬁrms. Let θij be i’s share of ﬁrm j, with
P
i∈I θij = 1 for all j. Let Rl
+ be the consumption set of each individual, i individual i’s
preference relation on Rl
+ (with strict preference i), ei (∈ Rl
+) his endowment, and Yj
(⊆ Rl) the production set of ﬁrm j. An allocation is denoted by (x,y) := ((xi)i∈I,(yj)j∈J),
meaning that individual i consumes the bundle xi and ﬁrm j’s production plan is yj. An
allocation (x,y) is feasible if xi ∈ Rl






j∈J yj. A coalition S is a nonempty set of individuals.1
We make the following assumptions throughout the paper without mentioning them
in our theorems or lemmas. Every individual i’s preference relation i is strongly monotone,




i∈I ei  0, i.e., it has positive quantity of each good. Every individual’s
endowment is a point in Rl
+ \ {0} (i.e., ei 	 0 for all i ∈ I). For every ﬁrm j, 0 ∈ Yj and
Yj is convex. To ensure the equal treatment property for ﬁrms, we assume that, for each
ﬁrm j, the production possibility frontier is strictly concave in the sense that no point on
this frontier is the midpoint of any two distinct points of the production set Yj.
1Note that a ﬁrm in this model is not a player but is a joint venture of its shareholders. Formulating ﬁrms
as players would require speciﬁcation of their objectives. Proﬁts would be an inadequate objective because
they depend on market prices, not taken as given a priori in the context of the core equivalence theorem.
22.2 Replica Economies
A replica economy of size r, denoted by Er, consists of r units, each of which has exactly the
same composition of individuals, ﬁrms, endowments, and corporate ownership. We name an
individual by an integer-pair i := (i1,i2), and a ﬁrm by j := (j1,j2), meaning—
i1 := the type of the individual (exactly one such individual in each unit);
i2 := the unit to which the individual belongs;
j1 := the type of the ﬁrm (exactly one such ﬁrm in each unit);
j2 := the unit to which the ﬁrm belongs.







θ(i1,k),(j1,k) = θ(i1,k0),(j1,k0) =: θi1j1.





θi1j1 if i2 = j2
0 if i2 6= j2.
The following notations will be useful:
I1 := the index set for individual-types;
J1 := the index set for ﬁrm-types;
I2 := J2 := {1,...,r}.
An allocation ((xi)i∈I,(yj)j∈J) has the equal treatment property (ETP) if individuals





2.3 The Meaning of Corporate Shares
As the resources for a blocking coalition partially come from the ﬁrms that they share with
outsiders, the notion of blocking depends on (i) how a ﬁrm allocates its tasks and products
3and (ii) how a ﬁrm makes decisions. As we consider a purely private ownership economy,
both issues should be settled according to the initial allocation of shares, ((θij)i∈I)j∈J.
For issue (i), we assume that shareholders are bound by their shares unless default is
allowed: Once a ﬁrm j’s production bundle say yj := ((yj)1,...,(yj)l) has been determined,
each shareholder i is responsible to carry out a fraction θij of the plan, contributing (resp.
receiving) θij|(yj)k| units of good k if (yj)k < 0 (resp. if (yj)k > 0). However, if default is
allowed, an individual can default on his share of the ﬁrm so that his net receipt from the ﬁrm
is null; if he defaults on a ﬁrm, all his share of the ﬁrm is distributed to other shareholders.
For issue (ii), we assume that there is a systematic corporate decision rule that uniquely
determines, for every initial assignment ((θij)i∈I)j∈J of shares and every coalition S, the set
˜ J(S) of all the ﬁrms that switch to the proposal of coalition S if S is blocking the status
quo. We say a ﬁrm j is controlled by coalition S if and only if j ∈ ˜ J(S). We assume that
the function ˜ J is exogenous and satisﬁes the following innocuous assumptions:
X
i∈S
θij = 1 ⇒ j ∈ ˜ J(S);
X
i∈S
θij = 0 ⇒ j 6∈ ˜ J(S). (1)
An example for such corporate governance is that every ﬁrm holds a referendum with
all its shareholders and it switches to the blocking coalition’s proposal if and only if the
proposal gets a vote greater than a predetermined threshold (with the assumption that all
shareholders outside the coalition oppose the proposal).
2.4 The Notion of Blocking
To motivate our notion of blocking, we start with a notion that does not make sense:
Deﬁnition 1 (wishful blocking) A feasible allocation ((xi)i∈I,(yj)j∈J) is wishfully blocked
by a coalition S if:
a. for every i ∈ S there exists an x0
i ∈ Rl
+ such that x0
i i xi, and
b. for every j ∈ J there exists a y0
















4Eq. (2) implies that the resources within a blocking coalition consist of the endowments of
its members and its share of the production plan of every ﬁrm. The problem of this equation
is that it also implies that a ﬁrm may do whatever the coalition wishes, whether the ﬁrm is
controlled by the coalition or not. Thus, this notion of blocking fails to capture the structure
of corporate controls in a private ownership economy.
To respect corporate controls, recall our assumption that every blocking coalition S
can unilaterally change the actions of the ﬁrms in the set ˜ J(S), determined by the initial
assignment of corporate shares. The question is How would those ﬁrms outside ˜ J(S) behave?
This question is important because the ﬁrms’ actions aﬀect the resources for the coalition. To
answer this question, we borrow an idea from Nash equilibrium: a deviating player expects
others to stick to the status quo. That leads to the next notion of blocking where a coalition
considers changes only in the ﬁrms that they can control and expects the other ﬁrms to stick
to the status quo. (In §3.4, we will consider cases where these other ﬁrms may change plans
in response to the blocking coalition.)
Deﬁnition 2 (inconsiderate blocking) A feasible allocation ((xi)i∈I,(yj)j∈J) is said to
be inconsiderately blocked by a coalition S if: (a) condition a of Deﬁnition 1 holds, and (b)
for every j ∈ ˜ J(S) there exists a y0





















Eq. (3) respects corporate controls by saying that the coalition can change the action of any
ﬁrm it controls but expects the action of any other ﬁrm to be ﬁxed at the status quo.
However, this notion of blocking is inconsiderate because such a blocking coalition gives
no regard to whether the consequence of its blocking is feasible at all for outsiders. With Rl
+


















then the outsiders cannot carry out their shares of the production plans, hence it is not
feasible for the coalition to have the resources described by the right-hand side of Eq. (3).
This is the interdependency problem.
The interdependency problem is clearly unavoidable when shareholders cannot default
on their shares. When default is allowed, the resources for a blocking coalitions would again
5be aﬀected by the outsiders should they default. In that case, the interdependency problem
takes a diﬀerent form, which we will consider in §3.4.
Hence we propose the next notion of (considerate) blocking, assuming no default.
Deﬁnition 3 (blocking) A feasible allocation ((xi)i∈I,(yj)j∈J) is blocked by a coalition S
if: (a) condition a of Deﬁnition 1 is satisﬁed, and (b) for every j ∈ ˜ J(S) there exists a
y0


















We call (4) the outsiders feasibility condition.
The core (resp. inconsiderate core, wishful core) is the set of feasible allocations that are
not blocked (resp. inconsiderately blocked, wishfully blocked). Within replica economy Er
of size r, let Cr (resp. Cr
incon, Cr





One direction of the equivalence between core and equilibrium is easy:
Lemma 1 Any Walras equilibrium allocation belongs to the core, as well as the inconsiderate
and wishful cores.
Proof It suﬃces to prove that a Walras equilibrium cannot be wishfully blocked. To do
that, mimic the proof of the ﬁrst welfare theorem with any wishful blocking coalition.
For the converse direction of the equivalence, we start with the equal treatment property
(ETP) of core allocations. The ETP for ﬁrms follows from the uniqueness of proﬁt-maximum
for any type of ﬁrms, as each ﬁrm’s production possibility frontier is assumed strictly concave.
With the ETP for ﬁrms, each individual of the same type has the same bundle of resources,
and then the well-known proof of ETP for consumers in exchange economies applies.
Lemma 2 (equal treatment) For any r = 1,2,..., any allocation in the core Cr has the
ETP. (Since Cr
wish ⊆ Cr
incon ⊆ Cr, ETP for Cr
incon and Cr
wish is also satisﬁed.)
Proof Appendix B.
6With the ETP, the core allocations in economies of diﬀerent sizes can be identiﬁed with






j1∈J1 Yj1. That is also true for Walras equilibrium






j1∈J1 Yj1, the set of Walras
equilibrium allocations is preserved by replication of the economy. Hence denote this set of
equilibrium allocations by W.
Obviously, C1 ⊇ C2 ⊇ C3 ⊇ ... and likewise for Cr
incon and Cr
wish. The main result of
this section is that these decreasing sequences shrink to W.
3.1 Inconsiderate Core Equivalence
Recall that our notion of blocking takes into account the feasibility condition for the out-
siders of a coalition, while inconsiderate blocking does not. To pin down the impact of
this feasibility constraint, we start by establishing core convergence based on inconsiderate
blocking, which will be contrasted with the core convergence theorem proved in the next
subsection. The propositions proved here will be useful for our main theorems.
To get an intuition for core convergence with inconsiderate blocking, assume within this
paragraph that preferences are all represented by continuously diﬀerentiable utility functions
and consider a non-equilibrium allocation where everyone’s consumption is strictly positive.
We show that this allocation is inconsiderately blocked: First, if the allocation is not Pareto
eﬃcient, it is blocked by the grand coalition. Second, if the allocation is Pareto eﬃcient,
by the second welfare theorem (Corollary 1, Appendix A), it is a price equilibrium with
transfers under some price p  0, i.e., given p, the allocation maximizes each ﬁrm’s proﬁt
and optimizes for every individual if his wealth is equal to the market value of his allocated
consumption. Third, if this equilibrium with transfers is not a Walras equilibrium, someone
must get a positive transfer, then the allocation is inconsiderately blocked by a plan similar
to that of Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green [12, p658]. Just replace x1 −e1 in their proof by
x1−e1−
P
j1 θ1j1yj1, where j1 indexes the types of ﬁrms and yj1 is a type-j1 ﬁrm’s production
plan in the allocation.
To prove inconsiderate core convergence for the general case without assuming diﬀer-
entiability or interior allocations, we start with wishful cores:
Proposition 1 W = ∩∞
r=1Cr
wish.
Proof Mimic Debreu and Scarf [5]. See Appendix C.
7By Proposition 1, a non-equilibrium allocation is wishfully blocked in suﬃciently large
economies. Is it also inconsiderately blocked? The answer is Yes if the economy is large
enough. To see the intuition, suppose an individual i prefers a consumption x0
i to the status
quo xi, but to consume x0
i he needs to change a ﬁrm j’s action into y0
j from the status quo yj.
The problem is that his share θij of ﬁrm j is too small for him to make that change. Hence i
only wishfully blocks the status quo. To pass that into inconsiderate blocking, make another
copy of the economy and label it by E0. Form a coalition consisting of this i and everyone in
E0. Then they can inconsiderately block the status quo: i receives the status quo production
bundle θijyj assigned to him from ﬁrm j; the counterpart of i in E0, however, receives the
bundle θijy0
j that i wishes for—the counterpart can do that because all the ﬁrms in E0 are
controlled by the enlarged coalition; then the counterpart swaps the bundle θijy0
j with i’s
bundle θijyj. With this plan, i gets to consume his perferred x0
i, and everyone in E0 can
still get the status quo consumption. Thus, i can make every coalition member better-oﬀ by
distributing part of his preferred bundle to the other members. Hence we have—
Proposition 2 (inconsiderate core equivalence) W = ∩∞
r=1 Cr
incon.
Proof See Appendix C.
Note that Proposition 2 would be the counterpart of the Debreu-Scarf theorem in
production economies if we ignore the feasibility constraint for the outsiders of a coalition.
3.2 Considerate Core Equivalence
The only hurdle between inconsiderate versus considerate core convergence is that the latter
needs to take into account the outsiders’ feasibility condition. The main idea to overcome
this hurdle is embodied by the following Lemma 3, which says that a blocking coalition’s dis-
turbance on feasible consumptions for outsiders diminishes as the replica economy enlarges.
An allocation (x,y) is edgy if the aggregate consumption bundle
P
i∈I xi lies on ∂Rl
+,
the boundary of the consumption set Rl
+. If (x,y) has the equal treatment property, then
we can write it as ((xi1)i1∈I1,(yj1)j1∈J1), and it is edgy if only if
P
i1∈I1 xi1 ∈ ∂Rl
+. Note that,








θi1j1yj1  0. (5)
8Lemma 3 (diminishing externality of blocking coalitions) For any feasible allocation
with equal treatment property, if it is inconsiderately blocked and is not edgy, then it is blocked
(in the sense of Deﬁnition 3) for all replica economies with suﬃciently large size.
Proof Suppose allocation (x,y), as speciﬁed by the hypothesis, is inconsiderately blocked
by coalition S with a plan ((x0
i)i∈S,(y0
j)j∈ ˜ J(S)). It suﬃces to prove Eq. (4) for suﬃciently
large size r. (Inconsiderate blocking is preserved when the replica economy enlarges.) Let
r
∗ := max{i2 : (i1,i2) ∈ S for some i1}.
Thus, for any j2 = r∗+1,...,r and for any ﬁrm-type j1, none of the coalition members hold














As the allocation is feasible and not edgy, the vector in the square bracket [···] is positive in
every component by (5); since r∗ is unchanged as r enlarges, the vector (6) goes to inﬁnity
in every component when r → ∞. Thus, the left-hand side of Eq. (4) belongs to Rl
+ when r
is suﬃciently large, as desired.
To ensure the non-edgyness for Lemma 3, within the rest of this subsection we assume—
Assumption 1 (boundary aversion) Every individual strictly prefers any interior point
of Rl
+ to any boundary point of Rl
+.
Lemma 4 Suppose Assumption 1. Then any element in the core Cr is not edgy.
Proof If an allocation (x,y) in the core Cr is edgy, then xi ∈ ∂Rl
+ for all individuals i ∈ I
(since xi ∈ Rl
+ for all individuals i). Then the grand coalition I blocks the allocation by
having every ﬁrm produce 0 and equally dividing the total endowment
P
i∈I ei among all
individuals. Since
P
i∈I ei  0 by assumption, everyone is better-oﬀ by the assumption of
boundary aversion. The outsiders’ feasibility condition Eq. (4) is vacuously satisﬁed.
Theorem 1 (considerate core equivalence) If Assumption 1 holds, then W = ∩∞
r=1Cr.
Proof Lemma 1 implies W ⊆ ∩∞
r=1Cr. For the converse, pick any allocation in ∩∞
r=1Cr.
Then the allocation is not edgy (Lemma 4 and Assumption 1) and consequently it is not
9inconsiderately blocked no matter how large the replica economy is (otherwise it is blocked
for any suﬃciently large r, by Lemma 3 and non-edginess). Then Proposition 2 implies that
the allocation is an equilibrium allocation.
Except Assumption 1, the preference- and endowment- assumptions of Theorem 1 are
similar to those in Debreu and Scarf [5] (detailed in §5). Since Assumption 1 is shown
indispensable in §3.3 and is indispensable even for some other notions of blocking by the
impossibility result in §3.4, Theorem 1 is a general version of the production-counterpart of
the Debreu-Scarf theorem.
3.3 The Indispensability of Boundary Aversion
Here is an example showing that the boundary-aversion assumption in Theorem 1 is indis-
pensable. In this example, preferences are not boundary-averse and there is a non-equilibrium
that cannot be blocked, though it is inconsiderately blocked. Since boundary aversion is not
needed for core equivalence had we ignored the outsiders’ feasibility condition (4), as in
Proposition 2, this example shows the eﬀect of incorporating the outsiders’ feasibility con-
dition into the analysis of cores.2
Example 1 (edgy core) There are two goods, two individual-types, and one ﬁrm-type. In
each unit, the endowment for the individual of type-1 is e1 = (1,0), and that for type-2 is
e2 = (0,1). For each type, the utility from consumption bundle (xi1,xi2) is
u(xi1,xi2) := xi1 + 10
√
xi2.
Each ﬁrm is equally shared by a type-1 and a type-2 individuals, its decision is determined









2As our intention is just to identify the eﬀect of production to core equivalence, we do not argue whether
boundary aversion is a strong or weak assumption. Nevertheless, we should point out that the assumption is
incompatible with strongly monotone and upper semicontinuous preferences. (Note however that Theorem 1
does not need upper semicontinuity.) This assumption also rules out quasilinear preferences. (William Zame
pointed out that it also rules out commodities that serve purely as intermediary products.)
10In any replica of the economy, there is a unique Walras equilibrium allocation:3
x
∗
1 = (0,3/4); x
∗
2 = (0,5/4); y
∗ = (−1,1); p
∗ = (1,2).
But the following allocation belongs to the core in any replica of the economy:
x
o
1 = (0,1/2); x
o
2 = (0,3/2); y
o = (−1,1). (7)
However, it is inconsiderately blocked in suﬃciently large economies, by Proposition 2.
Let us prove that the allocation (7) belongs to the core in any replica economy.
Note that (7) constitutes a price equilibrium with transfers, resulting from the following
procedure: First, under a price
p
o = (1,2),
each ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁt and distributes it equally to its two shareholders, each getting










3/2 if i1 = 1
5/2 if i1 = 2.
(8)
Second, each type-1 individual transfers his dividend, 1/2 dollar, to the type-2 individual in








1 − 1/2 = 1 if i1 = 1
w∗
2 + 1/2 = 3 if i1 = 2.
(9)
Third, given the wealth wo
i and price po, each individual i buys an optimal consumption, xo
i.
Now suppose a coalition S blocks the allocation (xo,yo) with a plan (x0,y0). Since xo
i







i. Thus (by Eq. (3)), the market
3To prove that, note that an individual’s consumption of good 2 cannot exceed 2 units. This follows from
the equal treatment property of equilibrium and the fact that there are at most two units of good 2 in each
unit economy, due to the technology and endowments. Thus, the marginal rate of substitution, in absolute
value, is at most
√
2/5. Since the slope of the production possibility frontier (the northeastern boundary of
the set R2
+ ∩ (e1 + e2 + Y )), in absolute value, is at least 1/2, any Pareto eﬃcient allocation would use all
the good 1 to produce good 2, i.e., an eﬃcient production plan is necessarily (−1,1). By the ﬁrst welfare
theorem, the equilibrium price ratio is p∗
1/p∗
2 = 1/2, the slope of the frontier at (−1,1). Then the equilibrium
consumption bundles are easily derived.



























We claim that (10) cannot hold. To prove that, recall that po · y0
j ≤ po · yo
j for any
technologically feasible production plan y0
j, hence po·ei+
P
j∈ ˜ J(S) θijpo·y0
j +
P
j6∈ ˜ J(S) θijpo·yo
cannot exceed individual i’s pre-transfer wealth w∗
i. Thus, the left-hand side of (10) is less
than or equal to
P
i∈S w∗











To prove this inequality, partition S into two sets, S1 and S2:
S1 := {(i1,i2) ∈ S : i1 = 1},








i) = (|S1| − |S2|)(1/2).
Here is where the outsiders’ feasibility condition (4) plays a crucial role: (4) implies that
|S1| ≤ |S2|.
Otherwise, outside S, there would be less type-1 than type-2 individuals, hence the outsiders’
endowment of good 1 is less than their endowment of good 2; consequently, it is impossible
for them to carry out the production plan yo = (−1,1) as part of the blocking plan for S (by




i) ≤ 0, as claimed. It follows that the allocation (7) cannot be blocked. 
Although this non-equilibrium is never blocked, it is inconsiderately blocked in large
enough economies by Proposition 2. (Independent of Proposition 2, Appendix D constructs
inconsiderate blocking plans for all non-equilibria in this example.) Thus, the example
illustrates the eﬀect of the outsiders’ feasibility coalition.
3.4 Allowing Default
So far we have been handling the interdependency between a blocking coalition and its
outsiders through requiring that a blocking plan satisfy the outsiders’ feasibility condition (4).
12An alternative is to disentangle the interdependency by allowing shareholders to default
on their shares. Then the outsiders can at least retain their endowments and secure a
feasible allocation among them, hence a blocking plan feasible within the coalition may be
automatically feasible for outsiders. Would this approach obtain a reasonably general core
equivalence theorem without the restriction of boundary aversion?
We give a negative answer by proving that core equivalence fails in the economies
of Example 1 for a class of blocking notions that allow default (Proposition 3). Thus,
boundary aversion is indispensable for core equivalence not only when the interdependence
problem takes the form of outsiders’ feasibility condition, but also when it is disentangled by
the possibility of default. Since the interdependence problem is inherent given the private
ownership of production technologies, boundary aversion appears to be a necessary price for
an extension of core equivalence to the Arrow-Debreu production economies.
3.4.1 A Set of Axioms for Blocking
Recall that ˜ J(S) is the set of ﬁrms controlled by a blocking coalition S. Let Θj denote the
set of shareholders of ﬁrm j: Θj := {i ∈ I : θij > 0}. Let us assume:
Axiom 1 (triviality) ˜ J(∅) = ∅.
Axiom 2 (unanimity) j ∈ ˜ J(Θj).
Axiom 3 (irrelevance of non-shareholders) j ∈ ˜ J(S) ⇐⇒ j ∈ ˜ J(S ∩ Θj).
All three axioms are self-evident. Axiom 3 says that adding non-shareholders of a ﬁrm
to the coalition does not aﬀect whether the ﬁrm is controlled by the coalition or not. Coupled
with Axiom 1, it implies that non-shareholders of a ﬁrm cannot control the ﬁrm.
Now replace the outsiders’ feasibility condition (4) with the possibility of default:
Axiom 4 (default) For any ﬁrm, any individual can choose to default on all his shares of
the ﬁrm (so that he gives 0 to and gets 0 from the ﬁrm). If he does so, his shares are divided
among other individuals in the proportion of their previous shares of the ﬁrm.
However, merely allowing default would make core equivalence easier to fail, because
even a Walras equilibrium may be blocked with default. For instance, suppose that 51% of
a ﬁrm is owned by Ms. Big and the other 49% is owned by Mr. Small, and the ﬁrm is ruled
13by majority of share. Then Ms. Big can choose a production plan such that it is infeasible
for Mr. Small to carry out his share of that plan with his individual endowment, so he has
to default and the ﬁrm becomes entirely owned by Ms. Big. Thus, a transfer of properties
occurs and results in an outcome diﬀerent from any Walras equilibrium.
Thus, if one still wishes to expand the scope of core equivalence, the other conditions
required by the blocking notions in previous subsections need to be modiﬁed. Let us relax a
previous assumption that the ﬁrms outside ˜ J(S) cannot deviate from the status quo.
Let ˜ K(S) be the set of all the ﬁrms that are not controlled by the coalition S and
whose productions may be changed in response to the blocking coalition—either to restore
outsiders’ feasibility or to retaliate the coalition—and such changes are expected by the
coalition when it plots the blocking plan. Call ˜ K response coordination.
We shall restrict the response coordination by the next axiom. Let
Proj2(S) := the set of units each of which contains some member of S.
Given a blocking coalition S, the units in Proj2(S) are called involved with S. The other
units are called uninvolved with S. The next axiom implies that only ﬁrms in the involved
units may change their production plans in response to the blocking coalition.
Axiom 5 (irrelevance of uninvolved units) ˜ K(S) = (J1 × Proj2(S)) \ ˜ J(S).
Without the “⊆” part of Axiom 5, the feasibility problem for outsiders could be resolved
trivially by altering production in the uninvolved units. To see this, suppose in an N-
replica economy, an allocation (x,y) is inconsiderately blocked by coalition S with a plan
((x0
i)i∈S,(y0















θijyj =: v / ∈ R
l
+.
Consider the (N + m)−replica economy and the same coalition S with the same blocking
plan. Let all ﬁrms in the uninvolved units produce 0. Then the total resource for the




i1 ei1  0, for all suﬃciently large m, v + m
P
i1 ei1 is
positive in each coordinate and hence S can “block” (x,y) in the (N +m)−replica economy.
However, it is not reasonable to expect that an uninvolved unit would change its action
in response to the blocking coalition. That is because an uninvolved unit can completely
14insulate itself from the eﬀect of the blocking coalition by sticking to any core allocation—
due to its equal treatment property, any core allocation can be achieved within the unit,
as each unit is self-suﬃcient. Whereas, the non-coalition members in the involved units are
directly aﬀected by the blocking plan, so it is more reasonable to expect that they would
adjust productions to recover their feasibility condition instead of hoping the people in the
uninvolved units to do that for them. Thus, we postulate Axiom 5.
To specify the response of outsiders, the next axiom assumes that they always try to
deter any blocking coalition that excludes them if such deterrence plan exists.
Axiom 6 (aversion to being left behind) The outsiders of S choose actions for the ﬁrms
in ˜ K(S) so that S cannot block the status quo, if such actions exist.
Axiom 6 is needed only if a blocking coalition does not include everyone. The outsider
who cannot be included is worse-oﬀ if the blocking plan is implemented. Naturally such an
individual would deter the blocking plan if he can. Hence this axiom is reasonable.
3.4.2 An Impossibility Result
The proposition proved next says that there is a sequence of replica economies such that
core equivalence is impossible for any notion of blocking that satisﬁes Axioms 1–6.
To see the intuition, imagine a situation where there is an individual-type who owns
some share of a ﬁrm and is endowed with all the inputs needed by the ﬁrm. If this monopolist
type is the decision maker of the ﬁrm, he can freely take over the stocks from the other
shareholders by telling them: “I am having the ﬁrm take an action infeasible for you unless
you default and give all your shares to me. Your default cannot undermine my plan because
you are endowed with no input for the ﬁrm.” To avoid this problem, one has to exclude
the monopolist from decision making. But then the core would allow a transfer from the
monopolist to the other shareholders: Having no control of the ﬁrm, the monopolist alone
cannot block this transfer; nor can he block it with some other shareholders, who gain from
this transfer. Thus, one way or another, someone is victimized.
Proposition 3 (impossibility) There exists a replica economy Er that satisﬁes all the as-
sumptions of Theorem 1 except Assumption 1 and yet, for any notion of blocking that satisﬁes
Axioms 1–6, the core does not converge to Walras equilibrium allocations as r → ∞.
15Proof We shall prove that Example 1 in §3.3 is such a replica economy (without relying
on its speciﬁc unanimity rule of corporate controls). Recall in that example that type-1
individuals are endowed with all of good 1, the input for production. Also recall that the
unique Walras equilibrium allocation is [x∗
1 = (0,3/4), x∗
2 = (0,5/4), y∗ = (−1,1)].
If, in some unit, the type-1 individual alone controls the ﬁrm in that unit, then he alone
can block a neighborhood of the Walras equilibrium allocation, hence the core is bounded
away from the equilibrium allocation for any size of the economy. His blocking plan is to
consume the bundle (0,1) and have the ﬁrm produce (−1,1). By the axiom of irrelevance of
uninvolved units, only the action of the ﬁrm in the involved unit is changeable but this ﬁrm
is already controlled by the blocking individual. Thus, given the blocking plan, the type-2
individual in the same unit must default to have a feasible consumption, leaving the entire
output (−1,1) to the type-1 individual and so making the blocking plan feasible.
Thus, we assume without loss that there is no unit where the type-1 individual alone
controls the ﬁrm in that unit. This, by the axiom of irrelevance of non-shareholders, implies:
If the type-2 individual in a unit does not belong to a coalition S, then
the ﬁrm in this unit does not belong to ˜ J(S), i.e., is not controlled by S.
(11)
We claim: The allocation where every type-1 individual consumes xo
1 = (0,1/2), every
type-2 individual consumes xo
2 = (0,3/2), and every ﬁrm produces yo = (−1,1), cannot be
blocked. If this claim is true, then the conclusion of the proposition follows.
It suﬃces to prove that the above allocation cannot be blocked under an additional shut-
down assumption: for any blocking coalition S, any ﬁrm j that belongs to ˜ K(S) (controlled
by outsiders of S) produces 0. If the allocation cannot be blocked under this additional
assumption, then the axiom of aversion to being left behind implies that the ﬁrms in ˜ K(S)
do produce in such a way that deters blocking.
Recall that the allocation [xo
1 = (0,1/2), xo
2 = (0,3/2), yo = (−1,1)], coupled with price
po = (1,2), constitutes a price equilibrium with transfers such that every type-1 individual
transfers all his dividend, 1/2 dollar, to the type-2 individual in the same unit, i.e., the
post-transfer wealth wo
i is equal to 1 dollar for type 1 and 3 dollars for type 2.
Suppose a coalition S blocks this allocation (xo,yo) with a blocking plan (x0,y0). By
the shutdown assumption, S gets the bundle 0 from any ﬁrm outside ˜ J(S). Denote θ∗
ij := 1
16if the outsiders default on ﬁrm j and otherwise θ∗



















i is optimal given po and wo
i, we have
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We shall prove that this inequality does not hold. Since yo maximizes proﬁts given po, it





















I.e., with each ﬁrm producing yo, the coalition cannot have more wealth from blocking the
dividend transfer than it would have from abiding to the transfer.
To prove (13), partition the coalition S into three parts: (i) n unit economies (i.e.,
n pairs of type-1 and type-2 individuals in the same unit), (ii) g type-1 individuals from
g separate units (where the type-2 individuals are not in S), and (iii) h type-2 individuals
from h units (where the type-1 individuals are not in S).
The total wealth of each of the n unit economies remains the same when the unit
joins S, as the dividend transfer is a pure transfer between the two individuals in each unit.
The wealth of each of the g single type-1 individuals remains the same when he joins S:
If he abides to the transfer, he loses his 1/2 dollar dividend. If he joins S, the ﬁrm in his
unit does not belong to ˜ J(S) by fact (11) and hence it belongs to ˜ K(S) by the assumption
of irrelevance of uninvolved units; so this ﬁrm produces the bundle 0 by the shutdown
assumption and hence this individual again loses the 1/2 dollar dividend.
For each of the h single type-2 individuals, in joining S, her wealth cannot increase: If
she abides to the transfer, she gains the 1/2 dollar dividend from the type-1 individual in
the same unit. If she joins S, she cannot gain more than this 1/2 dollar, because the total
proﬁt in her unit is only 1 dollar and she already has half of it without the transfer.
Thus, (13) follows. Hence the non-equilibrium allocation (xo,yo) cannot be blocked.
Although the above proof and Example 1 both use the fact that a coalition cannot
gather suﬃcient wealth to support its blocking plan, the forces that drive this fact are
diﬀerent. In Example 1, every type-1 member, by blocking the status quo transfer, brings
17to the coalition a net gain 1/2 dollar; but this contribution is oﬀset by the type-2 members
because the outsiders’ feasibility condition implies that a coalition needs to contain at least as
many type-2 as type-1 members. In Proposition 3, by contrast, a type-1 member contributes
no net gain to the coalition, because in blocking the status quo, he loses control of the ﬁrm
and gets zero dividend from it.
4 Discussions and Further Research
One innovation of this paper is to address the interdependency problem in production
economies. This problem is inherent given the possibility that ﬁrms are jointly owned by
individuals. Our notion of considerate blocking addresses the interdependency problem by
requiring that a blocking plan satisfy the outsiders’ feasibility condition. This notion of
blocking is appropriate if individuals cannot secede from the arrangement on their property
rights of the ﬁrms: A blocking coalition may expect that it can carry out any blocking plan
that takes resources from the outsiders via the obligation and entitlement implied by the
property rights arrangement, however draconian it may appear, as long as the blocking plan
admits feasible consumptions for the outsiders.
This notion of blocking is worthwhile considering because it has the appealing property
of admitting a general core equivalence theorem. The no-secession assumption implicit in
this notion makes sense because the notion of Walras equilibrium, which a core equivalence
is supposed to justify, also assumes that shareholders are bound by their dividend shares.
However, it may be interesting to consider other notions of blocking that allow indi-
viduals to withdraw from the existing property rights arrangement.
An alternative setup has been suggested to us, where an individual can secede from
the production economy and, if someone secedes, no one can use the production technolo-
gies. Then a blocking plan needs to satisfy the participation constraints for the outsiders.















This is equivalent to saying that the total bundle for the set ¬S of outsiders should be at
least as large as their total endowment. Otherwise, the outsiders may secede, making the
18production technologies useless to the blocking coalition. Let us call this strengthened notion
of blocking R(espectful)-blocking, and the corresponding core R-core.
The problem of R-core is that it does not work for core equivalence, nor even the equal
treatment property (ETP). To see that, consider any economy where the technology is to
use good 1 to produce good 2, zero production is Pareto inferior, and every individual has
a positive share of the ﬁrm in his unit. Then any non-zero production plan would have a
negative component at the coordinate for good 1, so condition (14) cannot be satisﬁed unless
the blocking coalition S is the grand coalition. Therefore, the R-core is equal to the set of
Pareto eﬃcient allocations. That has three consequences:
First, the ETP is not satisﬁed. Consider the allocation of giving all resources to indi-
vidual 1, making his consumption maximal, and having everyone else consume 0. Obviously
it is Pareto eﬃcient and hence is in the R-core, but it violates the ETP.
Second, since the ETP does not hold, it is hard to compare the R-cores in diﬀerent
replica economies because they cannot be represented in the same space. Thus, a core
convergence result ` a la Debreu and Scarf is impossible.
Third, even if the ETP issue were set aside, the R-core does not shrink when an economy
is replicated. That is because if an allocation (x,y) with ETP is Pareto dominated in an
r-replica economy Er, then the allocation is Pareto dominated in the 1-replica economy E1:
The fact that (x,y) is Pareto dominated in Er means that, for each individual (i1,i2) there
is an x0
(i1,i2) i1 x(i1,i2), and for each ﬁrm (j1,j2) there is a y0













































Yj1 for all consumer- and ﬁrm-types i1 and j1. Hence (x,y) is Pareto dominated even in E1.
Although the particular notion of R-core does not work, the idea of adding a participa-
tion constraint to the notion of blocking is interesting. The question is How to formulate the
“preferences” for the entire group of outsiders? Condition (14), which resorts to comparing
the quantities of the bundles, is not a compelling participation constraint, because the out-
siders do not necessarily opt for secession even when (14) is violated: by trading some goods
19away for other goods, the outsiders may be better-oﬀ than retaining their endowments.



















I.e., a blocking coalition should not take some good from the outsiders without returning
something. This condition is compelling because the outsiders would opt for secession if (15)
is violated: For any consumption plan (x0
i)i∈¬S for the outsiders feasible given the blocking
plan of coalition S, if (15) is violated then there is a bundle v ∈ Rl
+ \ {0} such that
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by strongly monotone preferences, x0
i + 1
|¬S|v i x0
i for all i ∈ ¬S; hence the outsiders would
unanimously opt for keeping only their endowments.
Call a considerate blocking plan that satisﬁes (15) superconsiderate blocking, and the
corresponding core the superconsiderate core, denoted by Cr
sup for the r-replica economy.
Then a core equivalence theorem based on superconsiderate blocking is at hand.
Theorem 2 Any Cr
sup-allocation has the ETP. If Assumption 1 holds, then W = ∩∞
r=1Cr
sup.
Proof The ETP simply follows from the proof of Lemma 2. Recall that the blocking plan
in that proof leaves the production plans (yj)j∈J in the status quo unchanged. Hence the










which is satisﬁed because any superconsiderate core allocation is Pareto eﬃcient and prefer-
ences are strongly monotone.
With ETP, the equation W = ∩∞
r=1Cr
sup is meaningful. The part “W ⊆ ∩∞
r=1Cr
sup”
follows directly from Lemma 1.
The proof for the converse “W ⊇ ∩∞
r=1Cr
sup” is similar to that of Theorem 1. The
only thing we need to change is Lemma 3. Now it says: if an allocation with ETP is
inconsiderately blocked and not edgy, then it is superconsiderately blocked if the replica
economy is suﬃciently large. We just need to add a proof for (15):
20First, if the allocation (x,y) is not Pareto eﬃcient, it is superconsiderately blocked
by the grand coalition, with (15) vacuously true. Second, if (x,y) is Pareto eﬃcient, (15)
is satisﬁed when the economy is suﬃciently replicated: That is because the left-hand side










by Pareto eﬃciency and strongly monotone preferences. Thus, (15) is satisﬁed when this
multiple is suﬃciently large.
Although (15) is a necessary condition to keep the outsiders from seceding, it need not
be suﬃcient. What is an appropriate formulation for the outsiders’ participation constraint?
More generally, how should the core be deﬁned and how does it behave when individuals
can opt out of a property rights arrangement? We leave these questions for future research.
5 Bibliography Note
Debreu and Scarf [5] considered a special case with production where the technology is con-
stant returns to scale and is available to all coalitions. Other than the main diﬀerences in the
treatment of production and the boundary aversion assumption, the assumption-diﬀerences
between our Theorem 1 and theirs are minor. Debreu and Scarf assumed insatiability and
continuity, we assume strong monotonicity but only lower semicontinuity. They assumed
strict positivity of individual endowments, we assume nonvoid individual endowments and
only strict positivity of the total endowment. Assuming strict concavity of production fron-
tiers, we do not cover constant returns to scale in this paper, but we do in a companion paper,
Xiong and Zheng [13], based on an alternative notion of blocking, stochastic blocking.
The most general core convergence theorem for exchange economies is given by An-
derson [3], who allowed nonconvex preferences. In [13], we prove an extension of Anderson’s
theorem to production economies.
Other than Debreu and Scarf, there had been two approaches to include production
to core equivalence, but none captured the interactions among shareholders. One group
of authors such as Hildenbrand [11, Ch. 4] and Boehm [4] assumed that every possible
coalition is endowed with a technology. Another group of authors, Allingham [2, pp52–53]
and Aliprantis, Brown and Burkinshaw [1], assumed that technologies are divisible and a
shareholder controls a fraction of the ﬁrm’s production set.
Haller [10] is the only earlier contribution to core equivalence that considers production
21and the ramiﬁcations of corporate control rights. Haller’s notion of blocking does not take
into account the constraint that the outsiders of a coalition need to have feasible consump-
tions, while the notions of blocking which our theorems are based on take that feasibility
constraint into account.
In addition to this main diﬀerence, there are other substantial diﬀerences between
Haller’s work and its counterpart in our paper. Haller’s notion of blocking is a precedent of
one of our intermediary notions of blocking, inconsiderate blocking. However, the two notions
are diﬀerent. As we will show, in his Example 2, an allocation cannot be Haller-blocked but
can be inconsiderately blocked. Furthermore, Haller’s core convergence theorem says that
if a non-equilibrium allocation satisﬁes an interior condition and a liquidity condition, then
the allocation is Haller-blocked. By contrast, our Proposition 2, core convergence based on
inconsiderate blocking, says that any non-equilibrium allocation is inconsiderately blocked.
Appendix E has detailed comparison.
Ellickson, Grodal, Scotchmer and Zame [7, 8, 9] prove core equivalence in their general
equilibrium theory of clubs. Unlike in our model, a blocking coalition in their model is not
interlocked with its outsiders in any ﬁrm, because they assume that a coalition forms clubs
(ﬁrms) within itself and its members do not join any club (ﬁrm) containing outsiders.
A A Complete Second Welfare Theorem
The second welfare theorem proved here, Corollary 1, is used by Lemma 2.4
Lemma 5 If ((xi)i∈I,(yj)j∈J;p) is a quasiequilibrium and p 6= 0, then p  0 and the
quasiequilibrium is a price equilibrium with possible transfers such that each person i’s wealth
is equal to p · xi.
Proof Let wi denote individual i’s wealth at the quasiequilibrium ((xi)i∈I,(yj)j∈J;p). By
deﬁnition of quasiequilibrium (e.g, [12, def. 16.D.1]), each ﬁrm’s production plan is proﬁt-
maximizing given p and each consumer is quasi-optimizing. Consumers’ quasi-optimization
4In textbooks, the second welfare theorem is usually presented in two propositions, one says Pareto
eﬃciency implies existence of a price that supports the allocation as a quasiequilibrium, and the other gives
a suﬃcient condition, which however is about the endogenous supporting price, for a quasiequilibrium to be
an equilibrium with transfers. Unlike such versions, Corollary 1 is based on purely primitive assumptions.
22and strongly monotone preferences imply that the supporting price is nonnegative in each
component, i.e., p = 0. Then it follows from proﬁt maximization and the assumptions
“
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p · ei +
X
j∈J
p · yj > 0.
Thus, there exists an individual i whose wealth wi at this quasiequilibrium is positive. It
follows that p  0: Suppose not, say pk = 0 for good k, then the new bundle x0
i obtained from
adding one unit of good k to individual i’s original bundle xi would cost him at most wi. As
his preference is strongly monotone, x0
i i xi. Then the quasiequilibrium condition implies
that p · x0
i = wi. By lower semicontinuity of his preference, we can scale down x0
i to λx0
i for
some positive λ suﬃciently close to one so that p·λx0
i < wi and λx0
i i xi, contradicting the
quasiequilibrium condition. Thus, p  0.
It follows that xi is optimum for each individual i with wealth w∗
i := p · xi: If xi 	 0
then w∗
i > 0 (since p  0), i.e., the cheaper-consumption condition is met, hence xi is
optimum by lower semicontinuous preferences; else xi = 0, then since p  0, person i’s
budget set is the singleton {xi} = {0}. Hence (x,y;p) constitutes a price equilibrium with
possible transfers such that each individual i’s wealth is w∗
i = p · xi.
Corollary 1 (second-welfare theorem) If (x,y) is a Pareo eﬃcient allocation, then there
exists a price vector p  0 that supoorts (x,y) as a price equilibrium with transfers.
Proof By the usual version of the second welfare theorem, there exists a p ∈ Rl
+ \ {0}
that supports the Pareto eﬃcient allocation as a quasiequilibrium (e.g., [12, prop. 16.D.1;
def. 16.D.1]). Then the corollary follows from Lemma 5.
B The Proof of Lemma 2 (Equal Treatment Property)
First, we show the ETP for ﬁrms: Since an element of the core Cr is Pareto eﬃcient (Eq. (4)
is vacuously satisﬁed for the grand coalition), by a modiﬁed version of the second welfare
theorem (Corollary 1 in Appendix A), there exists a price vector p  0 at which each ﬁrm’s
production plan is proﬁt-maximizing. Then the strict concavity of the production possibility
frontier implies that such production plan is unique for each type of ﬁrms.
23Thus, at any core allocation (x,y), individuals of the same type i1 have the same
production bundle
P
j1∈J1 θi1j1yj1 and hence the same bundle of resources ei1 +
P
j1 θi1j1yj1.
Then the ETP for consumers is proved as follows: If allocation (x,y) does not have this
property, then the well-known “underdog coalition,” consisting of a least favored individual
of each type, blocks (x,y) by the plan of keeping production unchanged and having each
member of type i1 consume 1
r
Pr
i2=1 x(i1,i2). As in the standard proof (e.g. [12, prop. 18.D.2]),





























To complete the proof, we need to verify Eq. (4), i.e., this plan is feasible for outsiders. Given























resource for outsiders also belongs to Rl
+. Hence Eq. (4) is satisﬁed, as desired.
C The Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
Proof of Proposition 1: The part W ⊆ ∩∞
r=1Cr
wish is easy, similar to the ﬁrst welfare theo-
rem. To prove the converse, ∩∞
r=1Cr
wish ⊆ W, pick any allocation from ∩∞
r=1Cr
wish. Since wish-
ful cores have the equal treatment property, denote this allocation by ((xi1)i1∈I1,(yj1)j1∈J1).
We shall prove ((xi1)i1∈I1,(yj1)j1∈J1) ∈ W by mimicking Debreu and Scarf [5].























αi1 = 1;∀i1 ∈ I1 [αi1 ≥ 0;zi1 ∈ Γi1]
)
.
Claim: 0 / ∈ Γ. Prove by contradiction. Suppose 0 ∈ Γ. Then
P
i1∈I1 αi1zi1 = 0, with
αi1 ≥ 0,
P
i1∈I1 αi1 = 1, and zi1 +ei1 +
P
j1∈J1 θi1j1y0
j1 i1 xi1, for some (y0
j1)j1∈J1 ∈ (Yj1)j1∈J1
24and for all i1 ∈ I1. Consider an arbitrary large integer k. Denote dkαi1e for the smallest
integer greater or equal to kαi1. Let S1 be the set of i1 ∈ I1 for which αi1 > 0. For each
i1 ∈ S1, let zk
i1 := (kαi1/dkαi1e)zi1. Note that zk
i1 goes to zi1 as k goes to inﬁnity. By the
lower semicontinuity of preference and the fact that zi1 + ei1 +
P
j∈J θi1j1y0
j1 i1 xi1, there
exists a large enough k such that zk
i1 + ei1 +
P
j∈J θi1j1y0











i1∈S1dkαi1e-replica economy, let the coalition consist of dkαi1e individuals of type i1
for each type i1, such that none of the coalition members live in the same unit. The blocking





and each type-j1 ﬁrm where this member is a shareholder produces y0
j1. (Since no two
coalition members share the same ﬁrm, they have no conﬂict on these production plans.)
This coalition wishfully blocks ((xi1)i1∈I1,(yj1)j1∈J1), contradiction.
Hence Γ ∩ {0} = ∅. Also Γ is convex; by the separating hyperplane theorem, there
exists a price p ∈ Rl \ {0} such that p · z ≥ 0 for all z ∈ Γ.
To complete the proof, by Lemma 5, it suﬃces to show that (i) ((xi1)i1∈I1,(yj1)j1∈J1,p)
is a quasiequilbrium and (ii) for all i1 ∈ I1,




because then Lemma 5 implies that it is a Walras equilibrium that requires zero transfer.
Let π∗
j1 := sup{p · y0
j1 : y0
j1 ∈ Yj1} for each ﬁrm-type j1. Since
x
0
i1 i1 xi1 =⇒ x
0








the separating-hyperplane property of p implies
x
0
i1 i1 xi1 =⇒ p · x
0






By local non-satiation of preference, (18) implies, for all i1 ∈ I1,
















ei1 + p ·
X
j1∈J1
yj1 = p ·
X
i1∈I1








j1 ≥ p ·
X
i1∈I1




25where the last inequality follows from the deﬁnition of π∗
j1. By (20),
P




hence every yj1 maximizes proﬁts for ﬁrms of type j1 under the price p. From (20) we also
have p ·
P





j1; hence (19) implies









for all i1 ∈ I1. This has two implications: First, Eq. (17) is true. Second, (18) implies
x0
i1 i1 xi1 ⇒ p·x0
i1 ≥ p·xi1 for all i1 ∈ I1. Hence ((xi1)i1∈I1,(yj1)j1∈J1,p) is a quasiequilbrium
and (17) is true, as desired. 
Proof of Proposition 2: To prove W ⊆ ∩∞
r=1Cr
incon, just mimic the ﬁrst welfare theorem.
To prove ∩∞
r=1Cr
incon ⊆ W, we shall prove that if an allocation is wishfully blocked in










Suppose in an r-replica economy Er, a feasible allocation (x,y) is wishfully blocked by






















With abuse of notation, let Er0 denote the other r-replica economy in the 2r-replica
economy E2r, i.e. E2r = Er∪Er0 and Er is disjoint with Er0. Let I,J be the sets of consumers
and ﬁrms in Er, and we use [0] to denote the counterpart in Er0, so I0,J0 are the sets of
consumers and ﬁrms in Er0, and S0 is the Er0-counterpart of S.
In E2r (= Er ∪ Er0), consider the coalition, S∗ := S ∪ I0, with the blocking plan:
i. Consumption: ((x∗
i)i∈S,(xi)i∈I0), i.e. every agent in S consumes x∗
i, and every agent in
Er0 takes the status quo consumption.
ii. Production: every ﬁrm in Er takes the status quo prouduction; the ﬁrms in Er0 takes













which is feasible since all Yj are convex and all the ﬁrms in Er0 are controled by S∗.
26To see that the above blocking plan is feasible, observe that pooling resources within









i∈S θijyj. Since S0 and

























Thus, it is feasible for members of S to consume (x∗
i)i∈S (recalling (21)), and it is feasible
for members of I0 to consume (xi)i∈I0, as (xi)i∈I0 is aggregate feasible in Er0.
Since this blocking plan makes each member of S better-oﬀ and none of I0 worse-oﬀ, it
can be slightly adjusted to make each member of I0 also better-oﬀ by lower semicontinuous
preferences. Thus, (x,y) is incosiderately blocked by the coalition S∗ in E2r, as desired. 
D An Inconsiderate Blocking Plan for Example 1
Here is a direct construction that inconsiderately blocks all non-equilibria in Example 1
without using Proposition 2.
We shall show that if an allocation is not Walras Equilibrium, then it can be incon-
siderately blocked. Clearly there is no loss of generality to assume that a non-equilibrium
allocation is Pareto eﬃcient, then it is an element of the following set:
{[x1 = (0,a); x2 = (0,2 − a); y = (−1,1)] : a ∈ [0..2]}.
There are two cases:
i. a < 3/4.
Consider the (N+1)-replica economy, and the coalition S that consists of all consumers
except the (N + 1)th type-2 consumer. The blocking plan is: Each ﬁrm in the ﬁrst








; the ﬁrm in the
(N +1)th economy sticks to (−1,1); the consumers in ﬁrst N-replica economy take the




2N − N + 1
2

. This blocking plan is feasible and inconsiderately blocks













































ii. a > 3/4.
Hence type-2 person consumes (0,2 − a) and (2 − a) < 5/4.
Consider the (N + 1)-replica economy, and the coalition S consisting of all consumers
except the (N + 1)th type-1 consumer. The blocking plan is: Each ﬁrm in the ﬁrst








; the ﬁrm in the
(N + 1)th economy sticks to (−1,1); the consumers in ﬁrst N-replica economy take




2N − N + 3
2

. This blocking plan is feasible and inconsiderately blocks













































E Comparison with Haller [10]
The model of Haller [10] is 2-period (0 and 1) incomplete markets where the only way to
reallocate the resources in period 1 is to trade the stocks of the ﬁrms in period 0. An
allocation in his model speciﬁes each consumer i’s share (θ∗
ij)j∈J of the ﬁrms, besides i’s
consumption x∗
i and each ﬁrm j’s production y∗
j. Part of his feasibility condition is that i’s
period-1 consumption should conform to this share (Haller[10, Eq. (I4), p830]):
x
∗








Hence people cannot swap their period-1 resources; they can only trade their resources
available in period 0. Thus, the only resources that a coalition can trade within itself
28are: period-0 endowments, period-0 productions, and the corporate shares its members are
endowed with. Speciﬁcally, if none of the coalition members is endowed with any corporate
share, every member’s period-1 consumption has to be the same as the status quo.
Unlike his model, our model is an Arrow-Debreu economy where agents can trade any
bundle in the commodity space.
Diﬀerent from the main focus of our paper, Haller’s notion of blocking does not re-
quire that a coalition’s blocking plan should allow the outsiders to come up with a feasible
consumption plan. Haller allows a blocking coalition to change the production plans of the
ﬁrms that it controls, but he does not require any condition about the outsiders’ consump-
tions given the new production plans. As explained in our Introduction, if it is infeasible for
outsiders to have feasible consumptions, they have to change the actions of the ﬁrms that
they can control and hence may upset the blocking plan of the coalition.
One of our intermediary notions of blocking, inconsiderate blocking, does not consider
the feasibility condition for outsiders of a blocking coalition. Hence Haller’s notion of blocking
is a precedent of inconsiderate blocking. But the two notions are diﬀerent because of Haller’s
restriction on the possible trades within a coalition, as explained at the ﬁrst paragraph of
this appendix. The next example illustrates this diﬀerence.




2 : y0 ≤ 0,y1 ≤ 1,y0 + y1 ≤ 0
	
type-1 consumer: e1 = (0,0);u1(x0,x1) =
1
2
x0 + x1,θ1 = 1
type-2 consumer: e2 = (1,0);u1(x0,x1) =
1
2
x0 + x1,θ2 = 0
type-3 consumer: e3 = (1,1);u1(x0,x1) = x0x1,θ3 = 0
The following allocation with equal treatment property,
y∗ = (−1,1) for the ﬁrm, [x∗
1 = (0,1/2),θ∗
1 = 1/2] for a type-1 consumer,
[x∗
2 = (0,1/2),θ∗
2 = 1/2] for type 2, and [x∗
3 = (1,1),θ∗
3 = 0] for type 3,
cannot be blocked in Haller’s model, but is inconsiderately blocked in our model.
The status quo allocation (x∗
i,y∗,θ∗) is inconsiderately blocked in our model even with-
out replication: The blocking coalition consists of a type-2 and a type-3 individuals. The two
coalition members are totally endowed with a consumption bundle (2,1) but zero corporate
29share. Hence the type-2 member can consume (1/2,1/4) and the type-3 member can con-
sume (3/2,3/4). Then the type-2 member is not hurt and the type-3 member is better-oﬀ,
so the former can be made also better-oﬀ by sharing a small bundle from the latter.
In Haller’s model, by contrast, this blocking plan is not feasible. That is because none
of the members of this coalition is endowed with any share of a ﬁrm, hence they cannot have
period-1 consumptions diﬀerent from the status quo (the ﬁrst paragraph of this appendix).
Even if we set aside the diﬀerence between Haller’s blocking notion and its counterpart
in this paper, inconsiderate blocking, the core convergence results based on these two notions
have diﬀerent ranges. Haller’s core convergence theorem says that if a non-equilibrium
allocation satisﬁes an interiority condition and a liquidity condition, then the allocation is
Haller-blocked.5 By contrast, our Proposition 2, core convergence based on inconsiderate
blocking, says that any non-equilibrium allocation is inconsiderately blocked.
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+: consumption set, 2
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